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Telemarketers Gone Mobile:
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
and Unsolicited Commercial Text Messages
J. Wesley Harned'
INTRODUCTION
B Y the early 1990s, a majority of American consumers had grown tired of
intrusive and frustrating telemarketing calls, in large part because these
unsolicited calls were automated and thus unavoidable.2 This created a need
for legislation, which was fulfilled by the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991 (TCPA).3 The decade and a half since the enactment of the
TCPA have seen courts struggle to apply the statute to complex situations
and new technologies. The advent of Simple Message Service messaging
(SMS or text messaging) as a mainstream form of communication in the
world of advertising4 has brought center stage the debate over whether the
TCPA should apply to unsolicited commercial text messages.'
Although telemarketing via text message is still in its infancy, text
messaging is certainly a novel way for businesses to communicate directly
with consumers-and advertisers know it.6 In fact, text message advertising
has become the advertising medium of choice in other parts of the world,
especially Europe.' Some European companies are going so far as to offer
free cellular minutes and text messaging to users who agree to receive
advertising on their cellular telephones.8 It is clear that businesses and
advertisers alike see an access route to the consumer conscience through
text messaging. It should then come as no surprise when the problem of
I B.B.A., 2005, University of Kentucky; M.B.A., 2oo6, University of Kentucky Gatton
College of Business and Economics; J.D., expected 2009, University of Kentucky College
of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Mark Kightlinger for reviewing drafts of
this Note and offering insightful suggestions for improvement. Also, the author would like to
thank his family for their love and support.
2 S. REP. No. 102-178, at 1-2 (1991), as reprintedin i99I U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1969.
3 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (2001 & Supp. zoo8).
4 Brad Smith, Mobile Advertising Gains Steam, WIRELESS WK., Oct. I, 2007, at 22, 22.
5 See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, No. C 06-2893 CW, 2007 WL 1839807 (N.D. Cal.
June 26, 2007); Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P.3d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
6 Jessie Bove, TxtMsgR NxtBig Thing, DISPLAY & DESIGN IDEAS, Oct. 2007, at 38, 38.
7 Shintaro Okazaki & Charles R. Taylor, What Is SMSAdvertisingand Why Do Multinationals
Adopt it? Answers from an Empirical Study in European Markets, 61 J. Bus. RES. 1,4-5(2008).
8 Smith, supra note 4.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
unsolicited commercial text messages becomes more widespread in this
country and courts become even more engaged in attempting to apply the
TCPA to this new business practice.
This Note will begin with a brief history and description of text
messaging technology. Next, in Part II the TCPA itself will be examined,
including its background and text. The focus will then shift to the two
cases that have addressed the question of whether the TCPA applies to
unsolicited commercial text messages in Part III. Part IV will focus on
whether a text message is a "call" for purposes of the TCPA. Part V will be
devoted to discussing whether an automatic telephone dialing system can
even be used to send SMS messages, a requirement for TCPA application.
The main objective of this Note is to raise questions regarding the
applicability of the TCPA to text messaging. Throughout the discussion,
much attention will be given to the reasoning of the two courts that have
addressed the issues presented. Although one court has determined
that the TCPA applies to text messaging, its reasoning should be closely
examined. The purpose here is not to criticize the court but to assess the
merits of the arguments advanced in support of its position. In the end, it
will be seen that while it may be that a text message constitutes a call for
purposes of the TCPA, an "automatic telephone dialing system" cannot be
used to send a text message, and therefore, the TCPA is not applicable to
unsolicited commercial text messages.
I. THE TEXT MESSAGING PHENOMENON
Finding someone who has not heard of text messaging in today's society
would likely be a difficult task. Not long ago, however, text messaging was a
mere blip on the mass communication radar. The world's first text message
was sent by Neil Papworth in December of 1992.' The message read "Merry
Christmas," which was only fitting as the man on the receiving end of the
transmission, Richard Jarvis, was at a Christmas party near the headquarters
of Vodafone in Newbury, England. 0 Although the industry quickly came
to know this technology as "Short Message Service" messaging, it would
take the better part of a decade before text messaging would emerge as a
popular form of wireless communication." It is estimated users will send
2.3 trillion text messages in 2008 alone, up from 1.9 trillion in 2007, and
sales from text messaging services will rise to $60.2 billion in 2008, up from
$52 billion in 2007.12 As these figures show, text messaging is rising in
9 Victoria Shannon, R Top Story 4 2day, Txt Msgs R t5 Yrs Old, From a Simple Christmas
Message a 'Cultural Phenomenon' Has Taken Root, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 2007, at i,
available at 2007 WLNR 24074104.
io Id.
1 Id.
12 Briefing: Text Messages Revenue Grow t6% in 2008, INT'L HERALD TIBUNE, Dec. 17,
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popularity as a form of communication throughout the world despite its
relatively short history as a form of mobile communication.
Analyzing the application of the TCPA to text messaging requires a brief
description of the technology involved. Text messaging "allows cellular
telephone subscribers to send and receive short messages ... usually limited
to 160 or so characters on their cellular telephones."13 Text messages are
sent between cellular telephone devices using cellular telephone numbers. 14
There are two ways that text messages can be sent.'" The first type of
text message is phone-to-phone messaging. Phone-to-phone messaging
involves sending a text message directly from one cellular telephone to
another.16 After typing the message into the cellular telephone, the user
designates or enters into the telephone a cellular telephone number
to which the message will be sent and sends the message. 7 The SMS
message is first transmitted to the user's cellular telephone carrier, which
relays the message to the receiving party's carrier, at which point the text
message is forwarded to the receiving party's cellular telephone.
The second type of text message involves the Internet and is called,
predictably, Internet-to-phone messaging.' 9 With this type of message,
the text message is initially delivered over the Internet as an email directed
to an email address assigned by a cellular telephone carrier to a subscriber. 0
Cellular telephone service providers actually receive an email message,
and after processing and converting that message to an SMS message, the
service provider sends the message on to the customer's cellular telephone
as a text message.2 ' As an illustration:
[A]ssume cellular [service provider] "Wireless" has assigned to its customer
the cellular telephone number (123) 456-7890 and has also given its
customer an email address [composed of this telephone number] and [the
2007, http:lwww.iht.com/articles/zoo72/12/ 7/business/techbrief.php.
13 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P.3d 831, 837 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
14 In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Controlling the Assault
of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, i9 F.C.C.R. 5056,5063 (proposed
Mar. 19, 2004) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64), 2004 WL 547587.
15 See id.
16 Joffe, 121 P.3d at 837.
17 Id.
18 Id. (citations omitted).
i9 In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Controlling the Assault of
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 19 EC.C.R. at 5063.
20 Id.
21 See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Controlling the Assault
of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Comments of T-Mobile USA, at
5-6 (Apr. 30, 2004) (codified at 47 C.ER. pt. 64), http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.
cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=65 161 82561 (quoting In the Matter of Implementation
of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 18 EC.C.R. 14783,
14846 n.471 (June 26, 2003)).
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service provider's] domain name, "wireless.com." An email sent to that
email address, 1234567890@wireless.com, will travel from the sender's
computer over the Internet to Wireless'[s] domain .... [There,] Wireless
will automatically convert the [email] into an SMS message and forward
that message to the customer's cellular telephone.Y2
What results is an Internet-to-phone text message. With this brief
description of SMS technology in hand, the focus will now turn to the
TCPA and its application to this new form of communication technology.
II. 'ME TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991
By 1991 "[u]se of the telephone to market property, goods, and
services directly to business customers, as well as individual customers,
[was] not only a common practice, but also a high growth industry." 3
Telemarketing Magazine estimated that "U.S. expenditures on telemarketing
[had] grown from $1 billion to $60 billion" over the ten years leading up
to 1991.14 Estimates also suggested that "annual telemarketing sales in
the United States quadrupled to $435 billion" between 1984 and 1990.5
This increase in sales was due in large part to the utilization of computer
assistance by "an estimated 82 percent of America's businesses conducting
telemarketing campaigns" by 1991.16 As a result, between 1990 and 1991
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) alone documented over
2300 complaints related to telemarketing calls.2 7 In addition, the Federal
Trade Commission, state regulatory agencies, local telephone companies,
and congressional offices also reported receiving substantial numbers of
such complaints.18 By 1991, consumer complaints regarding telemarketing
calls had become so vociferous that federal legislators began to move on
regulating telephone solicitation calls.2 9
In the early 1990s, Senator Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) and Representative
Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) sponsored the first pieces of legislation aimed
22 The preceding example of the Internet-to-phone SMS messaging system was
supplied by the Joffe court. 121 P.3d at 837 (citing In the Matter of Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Controlling Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003, Comments ofT-Mobile USA, at 5-6 (Apr. 30, 2004) (codified at 47 C.ER. pt. 64), http://
gulifossz.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=65 i6i 82561)).
23 H.R. REP. No. 102-317, at 7 (1991).
24 Id.
25 Rita Marie Cain, Call Up Someone and Just Say "Buy"--Telemarketing and the Regulatory
Environment, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 641 (1994); see also S. REP. No. 102-178, at 2 (1991), as reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1969-70.
26 H.R. REP. No. 102-317, at 7 (1991).
27 S. REP. No. 102-178, at I (1991).
28 Id.
29 Diane K. Bowers, A Victory on Capitol Hill, MARKETING RES., June 1992, at 40.
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at regulating unsolicited telephone calls. 30 Senator Pressler's bill was
intended to regulate unsolicited telephone solicitations "transmitted by a
live person, facsimile machine, and automatic dialing system," and the bill
called on the FCC to promulgate standards to that end. 3' Representative
Markey's bill sought to "impos[e] regulations on unsolicited advertising
using facsimile machines or automated dialing systems." 32 Both bills,
however, were criticized as vague and overbroad in application. Senator
Pressler's bill included within its reach telephone calls made by live
persons for "other commercial purposes."3 3 It was argued that because the
phrase "other commercial purposes" was not defined in Senator Pressler's
bill, the term could be interpreted to include survey research. 34 Through
the efforts of several advocacy groups, survey research was eventually
exempted from Senator Pressler's bill. Representative Markey's bill faced
similar scrutiny in that its application extended to telephone calls which
"encourage a commercial transaction."' 3 However, the committee report
on Representative Markey's bill clarified this language by stating that
the bill was not directed at survey research. 36 Regardless, Senator Ernest
Hollings (D-S.C.) consolidated the language and provisions of these two
bills, and on July 11, 1991, he introduced a new bill that would become the
TCPA.
37
The stated purpose of the TCPA is "to protect the privacy interests
of residential telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited,
automated telephone calls to the home and to facilitate interstate
commerce by restricting certain uses of facsimile (fax) machines and
automatic dialers. ' 38 The TCPA expressly prohibits the making of "any
call ... using any automatic telephone dialing system ... to any telephone
number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized
mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service
for which the called party is charged for the call."' 39 This last catch-all
clause was specifically aimed at the problem of unsolicited calls to cellular
telephones as Congress found that all too often the called party bore the
cost of unsolicited calls placed to cellular or paging telephone numbers.40
30 See id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 S. REP. No. 102-17 8 , at 6 (i991), as reprinted in i99! U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1973; Bowers,
supra note 29, at 41.
38 S. REP. No. 102-178, at i.
39 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(i)(A)(iii) (2000).
40 S. REP. No. o2-1 7 8, at 2.
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For example, cellular telephone users are stuck paying for each incoming
call regardless of whether a cellular telephone user pays for a bundle of
minutes or for each used minute.
It is worth noting at the outset that the TCPA is not applicable to every
telemarketing communication. 4' First, in order for the TCPA to apply, a
call must be made.4" Further, the TCPA applies only to unsolicited calls.
In other words, the TCPA applies only to prohibited calls made without
the "prior express consent of the called party."
4 Finally, a call must be
made using an "automatic telephone dialing system" or an "artificial or
prerecorded voice" in order for the TCPA to apply.' Absent the use of
an "automatic telephone dialing system" or an "artificial or prerecorded
voice," a call will not be subject to the TCPA, even if such call is unsolicited.
Because the TCPA does not define the term "call," whether a text message
is a call will likely be the most controversial issue with regard to the TCPA
and text messaging, although other requirements may present their own
unique challenges.
When the statutory requirements are met, the TCPA provides for
a private right of action and allows such action to be brought "in an
appropriate court of [a] state."4 This clause presumably allows a person to
bring an action under the TCPA in state or federal court. Injunctive relief
and damages are both available in cases where a violation of the TCPA is
found.46 The amount of damages recoverable under the TCPA is $500 or a
plaintiff's actual monetary loss, whichever is greater.
47 However, if a court
finds that a defendant has willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA, the
court may increase an award of damages by as much as three times.
48
The TCPA also expressly authorized the FCC to "require the
establishment and operation of a single national database to compile a list
of telephone numbers of residential subscribers who object to receiving
telephone solicitations. ' 49 The FCC, however, declined to create a national
do-not-call database, citing cost and feasibility as deterrents.
50 Instead,
the FCC promulgated rules implementing company specific do-not-call
registries, which must be created, maintained, and honored by telemarketers
41 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp, i 1i P.3d 831, 838 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
42 47 U.S.C. § 22 7 (b)(i)(A) (2ooo).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 47 U.S.C. § 22 7 (b)(3) (2000).
46 Id.
47 Id. § 227(b)(3)(B)-
48 Id. § 227(b)(3).
49 Id. § a27(c)(3).
50 Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek, The Do-Not-Call Registry Trumps Commercial
Speech, zoo5 MIcH. ST. L. REV. 483, 486, 487.
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for a period of five years.5' While the FCC declined to implement a national
do-not--call database, the Federal Trade Commission has since stepped
in and created the National Do-Not-Call Registry, although not without
some industry resistance."
It then fell to the courts to interpret the provisions of the TCPA and the
regulations promulgated by the FCC. However, courts not only had to do
battle with the plain language of the TCPA itself, they had the additional
task of adapting the TCPA to emerging and unforeseen technologies which
might become useful tools for telemarketers. One such communication
tool that surfaced is text messaging.
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
At present, only two courts have addressed the issue of whether the
TCPA applies to unsolicited commercial text messages. Most recently,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California addressed
the issue in Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster.5 3 The Satterfield case concerned
automatic telephone dialing systems and consent with respect to text
messaging, but did not reach the question of whether a text message is a
call.54 The other case addressing the TCPA as applied to text messaging is
the Arizona Court of Appeals' case, Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp.55
A. Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster
The plaintiff in Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster "visited www.nextones.
com (Nextones) to download a free ringtone" for her son's cellular
telephone.5 6  In the process of obtaining the free ringtone, the plaintiff
signed up to become a member of Nextones. In doing so, she checked
the empty box which read: "Yes! I would like to receive promotions from
Nextones affiliates and brands. Please note, that by declining you may not
51 See 47 C.ER. §§ 64.12oo(d)(3), (6) (2007).
52 When the FTC began regulating telemarketing calls under the TCPA many
questioned, in fact challenged, the FTC's authority to do so, saying that the TCPA authorized
only the FCC to implement such regulations. See Bush Signs 'Do Not Call' Bill, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Sept. 29, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2oo 3 /o7 /o7 /tech/main 5 61876.shtml.
After numerous courtroom battles over whether the FTC had legislative authority to establish
"do-not-call" lists, Congress enacted and President Bush signed into law a bill expressly
authorizing the FTC to do just that. See Bush Signs "Do-Not-Call" Law, Telemarketers Say
Registry WillRuin Them, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Mar. 12, 2003, at Ci.
53 Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, No. C 06-2893 CW, 2007 WL 1839807 (N.D. Cal.
June 26, 2007).
54 Id. at *6.
55 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P 3 d 831 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
56 Satterfield, 2007 WL 1839807, at *i.
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be eligible for our FREE content."57 The plaintiff then clicked "Submit,"
thus agreeing to the Nextones Terms and Conditions, one of which was
that Nextones and its affiliates may contact a user's cellular telephone
number in connection with any text message offering or other campaign.
58
On January 18, 2006, at half past midnight a little more than a year after
the plaintiff had signed up for Nextones, the plaintiff's son received a
text message on his phone, which stated: "The next call you take may be
your last... Join the Stephen King VIP Mobile Club at www.cellthebook.
com. RplySTOP2OptOut. PwdByNexton." 9 The message frightened
the plaintiff's son, so the plaintiff sent a reply message of "STOP.
'6 The
plaintiff was charged for this reply message. 61 The text message received
by the plaintiff's son was sent as part of a promotional campaign conducted
by the defendants. 62 The plaintiff commenced an action alleging the
defendants' conduct was "a textbook violation of the TCPA."
63
The defendants in Satterfield moved for summary judgment, arguing the
text message was not sent using an automatic telephone dialing system and
the plaintiff had consented to receiving such text messages.
64 The plaintiff
in Satterfield conceded that "the equipment at issue [did] not contain or
use a random or sequential number generator. '6 Instead, the plaintiff in
Satterfield pointed to the TCPA definition of automatic telephone dialing
system 66 and argued that "the phrase 'using a random or sequential number
generator' modifies only the last antecedent 'produce telephone numbers
to be called' [and] not 'to store."' 67 The Satterfield court, however, rejected
this argument, concluding that through a proper grammatical reading of
the definition, "using a random or sequential number generator" modifies
"store," "produce," and "called. ' 68 Because the plaintiff conceded the
equipment used by the defendants did not store, produce, or call randomly
or sequentially generated numbers, the Satterfield court held that an
automatic telephone dialing system was not in use and did not reach
the question of whether a text message is a call.69 The court continued,
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at *4.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See infra note 124 and accompanying text for the definition of "automatic telephone
dialing system."
67 Satterfield, 2007 WL 18398o7, at *5.
68 Id. at *6.
69 Id.
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however, stating that regardless of whether an automatic telephone dialing
system was in use, there could be no violation of the TCPA because the
plaintiff had consented to receiving such text messages.70 Although the
Satterfield court provides the only authority on consent in context of the
TCPA and text messaging, consent is fairly self explanatory and will not be
discussed further.
B. Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp.
While the Satterfield court did not reach the question of whether a
text message is a "call" and only touched briefly on automatic telephone
dialing systems in conjunction with text messaging, the court in Joffe v.
Acacia Mortgage Corp. delved much deeper into both issues. In Joffe, the
plaintiff, Rodney Joffe, received an unsolicited text message on his cellular
telephone from Acacia, a mortgage company.7 Some months later, Joffe
received a second unsolicited text message from Acacia.7" The court noted,
"Acacia's messages to Joffe were part of a marketing campaign to advertize
[sic] low interest rates on home mortgages."73 "Acacia programmed its
computers to send the solicitations as electronic mail messages ... over the
Internet to consumer e-mail addresses."7 4 As with any Internet-to-phone
message, "Acacia's computers generated [Joffe's] cellular telephone number,
'(602)XXX-XXXX,' plus his cellular telephone carrier's domain name, 'att.
net,' and sent the solicitations to the e-mail address 602XXXXXXX@att.
net."7 " Pursuant to his private right of action, Joffe filed a complaint in
Arizona state court alleging Acacia had violated the TCPA.7 6 The trial
court stated, "By doing advertising in this manner, [Acacia] shifted some
of the cost of its advertising to those receiving the telephone calls."77 The
trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Joffe.7 8 Acacia
appealed, but the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the order, holding that
although text messaging was involved, Acacia nevertheless called Joffe
using an automatic telephone dialing system in violation of the TCPA.79
The Arizona Court of Appeals appeared comfortable in its position that
the TCPA applies to text messaging, but further legal analysis may cast doubt
on that conclusion. The next two parts will present and critically discuss
70 Id.
71 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 1z I P.3d 83 1, 833 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 834.
79 Id. at 843.
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the reasoning behind the Joffe court's holding that Acacia called Joffe using
an automatic telephone dialing system. These parts will assess the merits
of the arguments advanced by the Joffe court in support of its position that
a text message is a "call," and that a text message can be sent using an
automatic telephone dialing system. This analysis will ultimately support
the conclusion that the TCPA cannot apply to unsolicited commercial text
messages.
IV. CAN A TEXT MESSAGE BE A "CALL:' UNDER THE TCPA?
In order for the TCPA to apply, a call must be made.80 The obvious and
most controversial issue is whether a text message can be said to be a "call"
for purposes of the TCPA. In a practical sense, sending a text message is
an alternative to making a call using a cellular telephone. While the court in
Satterfield did not reach the issue, the Joffe court concluded a text message
is a call under the TCPA.1 While further analysis may cast some doubt on
the Joffe court's reasoning, there is clearly some merit in its conclusions.
A. The Meaning of "Ca/l"
As theJoffe court noted, the term "call" is not defined in the TCPA.
2 The
court settled on the common meaning of "call" associated with telephone
use and concluded, "given that the TCPA was designed to regulate the
receipt of automated telephone calls, Congress used the word call to refer
to an attempt to communicate by telephone."83 To this point, it is difficult
to argue with the definition of call chosen by the court, as "attempt to
communicate by telephone" is the traditional meaning of the word "call."
However, by rejecting Acacia's interpretation of call, the court arguably
stretches this traditional meaning of the word. On appeal, Acacia argued
the TCPA applied only to "ordinary telephone calls ... that present the
potential for two-way real time voice 'intercommunication."'
4 The court
concluded that the TCPA does not limit the attempt to communicate by
telephone, i.e., the call, to two-way real time voice "intercommunication.
" 8s
This certainly seems to be an expansion of the traditional "attempt to
communicate by telephone" meaning of "call." The Joffe court then set
out to explain its reasoning.
The Joffe court noted, "the TCPA states it 'shall be unlawful for any
person... to make any call... using an automatic telephone dialing system.
80 47 U.S.C. § 22 7 (b)(i)(A) (2000).
81 Joffe, 121 P.3 d at 837.
82 Id. at 835. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2ooo).
83 Joffe, 121 P3d at 835.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 835-36.
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.. to any telephone number assigned to a ... cellular telephone service."'86
The court said that "[iut is the act of making a call, that is, of attempting to
communicate to a cellular telephone number.., that the TCPA prohibits,"
and "[w]hether the call had the potential for a two-way real time voice
communication is irrelevant." 87 This led to the court's holding that "an
attempt to communicate by telephone constitutes a call under the TCPA
even if the attempted communication does not present the potential for
two-way real time voice intercommunication."88 However, in attempting
to explain its reasoning, the court merely restated its conclusion. What the
court failed to do is explain why an attempt to communicate by telephone
without the potential for two-way real time voice intercommunication
is a "call." The court provided little on which to base a conclusion that
Congress intended such a broad meaning of the word. If Congress intended
the meaning of call under the TCPA to extend beyond its traditional
definition, why did Congress not use a word or phrase with a broader
meaning, maybe even "attempting to communicate through the use of a
telephone"? Such a phrase would suggest that the TCPA's prohibition also
extends to conduct other than traditional telephone calls. It could be that
Congress contemplated only one type of "call" and no thought was given
to other potential uses of the word. Or perhaps Congress was satisfied
that other TCPA provisions would clarify that the statute was intended
to reach a broader range of activities and technologies than that involved
with traditional telephone calls. The Joffe court certainly thought the latter
to be true, and it pointed out other parts of the TCPA as support for its
position. 89
In support of its view that "calls" under the TCPA do not require
two-way voice intercommunication, the Joffe court cited the phrase
"artificial or prerecorded voice," found in TCPA section (b)(1)(A). 90 The
court concluded since the TCPA "prohibits any call using an artificial or
prerecorded voice to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone
service," its interpretation of call must be correct because "[a] call made
by an artificial or prerecorded voice has no potential for a real time voice
intercommunication."'9 This conclusion is logical and provides some
support for the court's position, but the Joffe court went further, citing the
case of Irvine v. Akron Beacon JournaP2 for additional support. 93
86 Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(i) (zooo)) (emphasis added by court).
87 Id. at 836.
88 Id.
89 See id. at 835-36.
90 Id. at 836.
91 Id.
92 Irvine v. Akron Beacon Journal, 770 N.E.2d 1 1o5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
93 Joffe, 121 P3d. at 831.
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At issue in Irvine was TPCA section (a)(4), which defines "telephone
solicitation" as "the initiation of a telephone call or message for the
purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of... goods... or services."
94
The defendant in Irvine used an autodialer to generate a telemarketing
solicitation list.95 The autodialer called numbers from a pre-programmed
list of disconnected telephone numbers, and, depending on the type of
sound signal received, the autodialer recorded which of the telephone
numbers had been reconnected and were working. 96 As soon as the
autodialer detected the sound signal, it recorded the information and
dropped the call. 97 The defendant in Irvine asserted the calls were not
telephone solicitations under the TCPA because no solicitors were on the
calls when they were placed.98 The court rejected the argument, stating
there was "no language in the statute requiring that a conversation take
place." 99
Although the Joffe court found the reasoning of the Irvine court
persuasive and useful as support for its position,1 1 the Irvine case adds
little and arguably does harm to the Joffe court's position. First, it is true
the TCPA has no language requiring that a conversation take place, but
this does not provide a clear solution to the problem. It seems the Irvine
court was speaking to the fact that the TCPA only requires one to make a
call, just as telephone solicitation requires only the initiation of a telephone
call. The Irvine court stated, "Whether a solicitor is at the other end of the
phone or not, when the telephone rings, the intrusion into the home and
the seizing of the telephone line is the same."10' Here, the court seemingly
refered to instances where the telephone rings but the caller hangs up, or
ends the call, before the receiving party can answer. It is in this sense that
the TCPA does not require a conversation to take place; the Irvine court
makes no mention of the potential for two-way voice intercommunication.
Further, the Irvine case arguably exposes the Joffe court's position to an
expressio unius counterargument. The term "telephone solicitation"
involves "the initiation of a telephone call or message... " while the TCPA
section relevant here prohibits only calls.10 Although such canon-based
arguments can be countered, this could be interpreted as evidence of a
conscious decision to leave messages out of the TCPA prohibitions. In the
94 Irvine, 770 N.E.zd at i i18 (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(a)(4) (Supp. 2008)).
95 Id. at I IO8-O9.
96 Id. at 1 io9.
97 Id.
98 Id. at iI8.
99 Id.
IOO SeeJoffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P.3d 831, 836 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
ioi Irvine, 770 N.E.zd at 1 I 19.
102 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(a)(4) (Supp. zoo8) (emphasis added); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)
(2000).
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end, the soundness of the Joffe court's reasoning that a call under the TCPA
has a broader meaning than the traditional "attempt to communicate by
telephone" remains questionable. However, the Joffe court may have
overlooked an argument that better supports its position.
While the reasoning given by the Joffe court is somewhat suspect, there
exists an argument not advanced by the Joffe court which supports that
court's conclusion. This argument utilizes the specific language of the
TCPA. The TCPA states, in part, "It shall be unlawful ... to make any call.
.. to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone
service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier
service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call." ' 3
Utilizing the maxim noscitur a sociisi, or "it is known from its associates,"
each of the enumerated services involves by implication a "called party"
who is "charged for the call."" ° It follows then that sending a page through
a paging service would involve making a call for purpose of the TCPA.
Arguing by analogy to paging, a text message, especially a phone-to-phone
message, could be a "call" for purpose of the TCPA. Both a page and a
phone-to-phone message involve communications over a telephone line
without the potential for real time two-way voice intercommunication.
Although the noscitura sociisi argument is somewhat weaker when applied
to Internet-to-phone messages, it could still be argued not all of the
services enumerated in TCPA section (b)(1)(A) necessarily involve only
communication over telephone lines.105 For example, "specialized mobile
radio service" and "other radio common carrier service" seemingly involve
communication via radio signal and arguably do not involve telephone lines
at all. From this one could argue that the word "call" under the TCPA
was intended to extend beyond its traditional meaning associated with
telephone use, all the way to SMS messages. The language of the TCPA
itself can be used as additional support for the Joffe court's position that a
text message is a call under the TCPA.
The paging service analogy certainly has its limits, especially when
applied to Internet-to-phone messages such as those sent in Joffe. Instead
of communicating solely over a telephone line, as paging entails, Internet-
to-phone messages bring computers and email into the mix. This could
stretch the nosciturasociis argument too far, as an ever-expanding definition
of "call" might extend the TCPA's coverage into areas such as email, an
area possibly covered by other federal statutes. In fact, section 14(b) of
the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing
Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM Act) directs the FCC to issue rules protecting
103 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(i)(A)(iii) (zoo).
io4 The canon-based argument is that the last clause in § 227(b)( 1)(A)(iii), which states
"or any services for which a charged party is called," implies that a "paging service" involves a
"called party" and the party receiving a page is "charged for the call." Id. (emphasis added).
105 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(i)(A).
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consumers from "unwanted mobile services commercial messages," or
MSCMs.' ° An MSCM is a "commercial electronic mail message that is
transmitted directly to a wireless device that is utilized by a subscriber
of commercial mobile service (as such term is defined in [47 U.S.C.
332(d)(1)]) in connection with such service.""1 7 The Joffe court even noted
"[tihe legislative history of the CAN-SPAM Act reflects § 14 was inserted
into the statute to address unwanted text messages sent to wireless devices
including cellular telephones."'"" However, this is not to say that the CAN-
SPAM Act has preempted the TCPA. To the contrary, section 14(a) of the
CAN-SPAM Act states, "[niothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to
preclude or override the applicability of [the TCPA] ..... 09 Therefore,
further support remains for the position that text messages are "calls"
under the TCPA, as Congress contemplated that the CAN-SPAM Act and
the TCPA could have dual applicability.
B. The FCC's Position on the Issue
Near the end of its discussion of the definition of "call," the Joffe court
cites a 2003 order issued by the FCC that arguably provides substantial
support for its position."' The FCC order reflects the FCC's opinion
that the TCPA ban on making "any call using an automatic telephone
dialing system " extends to encompass "text calls to wireless numbers.""'
Does this resolve the debate over whether a text message is a call? The
answer depends on the weight to be given to a federal agency opinion
or interpretation. While this Note does not propose to explore such
administrative law issues in depth, it is worth noting that a full Chevron-
Mead analysis"2 would be needed to determine the actual legal significance
of the FCC's statements. Moreover, regardless of the outcome of such an
io6 15 U.S.C.A. § 7712(b) (Supp. 2oo8).
107 15 U.S.C.A. § 7712(d) (Supp. 2oo8).
io8 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P.3d 831, 840 (Ariz. Ct. App. zoo5).
109 15 U.S.C.A. § 7712(a) (Supp. zoo8).
iio SeeJoffe, 121 P3d at 837.
iii See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 18 EC.C.R. 14014, 14115 (June 26, 2003), 2oo 3 WL 21517853.
112 In the case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984), the U.S. Supreme Court established a two-prong analysis for determining whether
a court should defer to an agency's interpretation of a regulation. This analysis asks first
whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue and if so, such interpretation controls. If
not, the second prong allows the court to determine whether the agency's answer is based on
a "permissible construction of the statute." In the later case of United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. zi8, 226-27 (zooI), the Supreme Court added another layer to the analysis. The Mead
decision requires courts to determine whether a statute includes authorization for deference
to agency interpretation. This Note seeks the best interpretation of the word "call" rather
than a definition that might be found "reasonable" by a court under principles of judicial
deference.
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analysis, the goal of this Note remains to assess the merits of the arguments,
including those advanced by the FCC on the issue.
In short, the FCC's position is that a text message is a call. 113 The FCC
order states that the TCPA prohibition "encompasses both voice calls and
text calls to wireless numbers.., provided the call is made to a telephone
number assigned to such service.""' 4 The FCC then makes several
references to costs placed on wireless telephone subscribers." 5 The FCC
appears to draw support for its position from the last catch-all clause in
TCPA section (b)(1)(A)(iii). That clause states, "or any service for which
the called party is charged ...-116 The FCC order states, "The commission
has long recognized ... that wireless customers are charged for incoming
calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used.""' 7 The
FCC order observes that most wireless customers pay a fixed rate for a
"bucket" of minutes, and they are charged for any minutes used over the
bucket allowance." 8 The FCC notes the bucket "could be exceeded more
quickly if consumers receive numerous unwanted telemarketing calls."" 9
Anyone with a cellular telephone plan knows such plans are now, at least
in part, designed around the number of text message "minutes" allowed,
and most users are aware of how much extra text messages cost. There
may be, however, another type of cost shifted to the consumer when an
unsolicited commercial text message is sent. In business, an important
anecdote is "time is money." No saying better captures the spirit of the
marketing and advertising industry, where the most time-consuming task is
gaining access to the consumer. If advertisers can access consumers at any
moment by cellular telephone, they shift the time burden of advertising to
the consumers in the form of nuisance and inconvenience. In this sense,
receiving a text message would be no less of a cost-shifting activity than
receiving a traditional call on a cellular telephone. In the sense that the
TCPA is meant to protect consumers from bearing the cost of unsolicited
telemarketing practices, the FCC's point that the TCPA applies equally to
"text calls" is well taken.
Again, the weight to be given to the FCC's opinion on the issue of
whether a text message is a call depends heavily upon a determination
outside the scope of this note. But there must nevertheless be some weight
accorded to the FCC's views. When the FCC's interpretation is placed
113 See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of I99i, 18 EC.C.R. 14014, 14115 (June 26, 2003), 2003 WL 21517853.
114 Id.
115 Id.
i16 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)(iii) (2000).
117 In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 18 FC.C.R. 14014, 14115 (June 26, 2003), 2003 WL 21517853.
118 Id.
ii9 Id.
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alongside the arguments in support of the Joffe court's position, a fairly
sound argument begins to emerge that a text message could constitute a
call under the TCPA. In fact, the only real argument that has been put
forward opposing that position seems to be that "call" under the TCPA
should be given its most narrow, traditional meaning, i.e., an attempt to
communicate by telephone with the potential for real time two-way voice
intercommunication.1 0 There is support for the notion that the word
"call," for purposes of the TCPA, was intended to have a broader meaning,
one that extends to encompass non-traditional telephone communications
such as text messages.' Even so, does this mean that the TCPA applies to
text messaging? As discussed below, there may be an as of yet unforeseen
obstacle in the way of the TCPA's application to text messaging.
V. CAN A TExT MESSAGE BE SENT USING
AN AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE DIALING SYSTEM?
In the text messaging context,' even if a call is made, it must be made
using an "automatic telephone dialing system" for the TCPA to apply. '
The TCPA defines an "automatic telephone dialing system" as "equipment
which has the capacity-(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be
called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial
such numbers."'214 The issue of the use of an automatic telephone dialing
system in conjunction with text messaging was presented in both Saterfeld
and Joffe.' As discussed above, the Satterfield court briefly addressed the
plaintiff's grammatical challenge to the definition of automatic telephone
dialing system.2 6 Ultimately the Sauterfield court held no automatic
telephone dialing system was in use, after the plaintiff conceded the
equipment at issue did not contain or use randomly or sequentially
generated numbers.'27
On the other hand, the defendant in Joffe offered a more sound critique
of the definition of automatic telephone dialing system as it applies to
text messaging. Although the defendant in Joffe conceded "its computers
120 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P.3d. 831, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
121 See generally Joffe, 121 P 3d at 831.
122 Section (b)(i)(A) of the TCPA also prohibits making "any call ... using any automatic
telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice .... However, text messaging
involves the transmissions of text and not sounds, e.g., voices. Therefore, only an "automatic
telephone dialing system" would be applicable to text messaging.
123 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A) (2000).
124 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(a)(I)(A), (B) (zooo).
125 See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, No. C 06-2893 CW, 2007 WL 1839807, at *4-6
(N.D. Cal. June 26, 2007); Joffe, 121 P 3d at 838-39.
126 Satterfield, 2007 WL 1839807, at *4-6; see supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
127 Satterfield, 2007 WL 1839807, at *6.
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randomly or sequentially produced telephone numbers," the defendant
argued "it did not contact Joffe by using equipment that called or dialed
his cellular telephone number."' 8 This argument went further than the
plaintiff's argument in Satterfield, calling into question the meaning of the
terms "call" and "dial" in the definition of automatic telephone dialing
system. The court in Satterfield did not address this issue, and the Joffe
court, after devoting only a footnote to addressing the meaning of "dial,"
concluded that by sending a text message, Acacia used an automatic
telephone dialing system to call Joffe's cellular telephone number. l 9
However, the issue of whether text messaging involves dialing a cellular
telephone number likely presents the biggest obstacle for applying the
TCPA to text messaging. Thus, it is possible that any equipment which
generates only text messages cannot be an automatic telephone dialing
system.
The equipment used by the defendant in Joffe generated an email
message which was sent to an email address consisting of Joffe's cellular
telephone number and his service carrier's domain name. Once the message
reached that email address, it was converted by Joffe's cellular service carrier
into SMS format and transmitted to Joffe's cellular telephone as an SMS
message. This chain of events did not involve any function traditionally
associated with dialing a telephone number-the entry of a telephone
number into a telephone using a keypad or rotary dial. Nevertheless, the
Joffe court was persuaded that text messaging, particularly Internet-to-
phone messaging, involves dialing a cellular telephone number.
As with the word "call," the word "dial" is not defined in the TCPA.130
The Joffe court stated that "In the context of the phrase'to dial such numbers'
the words 'to dial' mean to 'operate' or 'manipulate' a device 'in order' to
make or establish a telephone call or connection."' 31 But the Joffe court's
definition raises even more questions. What does it mean "to operate or
manipulate a device"? In their respective verb forms, the word "operate"
means "to control the functioning of ' ' 3 and the word "manipulate" means
"to ... operate, or control by the hands ... especially in a skillful manner."'133
It appears as though under the Joffe court's definition of "to dial," phone-
to-phone messaging would involve dialing. In sending a phone-to-phone
message, a user operates or manipulates a device as the user controls the
functioning of a cellular telephone or operates it with his hands. The Joffe
court, however, was addressing Internet-to-phone messaging, and it is less
128 Joffe v. Acacia Mortgage Corp., 121 P.3d 83 1, 838 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
129 Id. at 839.
130 See generally 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (200' & Supp. 2oo8).
131 Joffe, 121 P.3d at838 n. Io.
132 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1233 (4
th 
ed. 2000).
133 Id. at 1064.
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certain whether the court's definition of "to dial" is applicable to that type
of message.
As seen above, Internet-to-phone messages are initially transmitted as
emails but are later converted into SMS messages by the receiving party's
cellular service provider. Presumably the equipment at issue in Joffe was
a "device." But if the equipment was a computer which generated mass
email messages and sent the emails to randomly or sequentially generated
email addresses, was the equipment being operated or manipulated?
Operating or manipulating a device connotes human interaction in that
one must control the functioning of the device or operate the device
with his hands. This idea conforms to the traditional notion of dialing a
telephone number-a person causing a telephone number to be entered
into a telephone using a keypad or rotary dial. The equipment in Joffe
generated email messages and sent them to randomly or sequentially
generated email addresses consisting of cellular telephone numbers and
domain names. It would be difficult to say that someone was controlling
the functioning of such equipment or operating the equipment by hand.
To the contrary, the equipment at issue in Joffe presumably generated and
sent the email messages automatically. Without the human interaction
implied by "to operate or manipulate," it appears that Internet-to-phone
messages do not involve dialing as that word is defined in Joffe. The Joffe
court, however, appears to dodge the straightforward definition of dialing.
The court concluded "Acacia used an attenuated method to dial a cellular
telephone number."' 1 The court does not explain its approval of, and the
TCPA does not authorize, the use of an attenuated, or weakened, method of
dialing. 3 Add in the fact that in a practical sense, sending a text message
is normally thought of as an alternative to dialing and calling another party,
and it seems difficult to argue that Internet-to-phone messaging involves
dialing a telephone number as the Joffe court concluded.
Finally, it is notable that the TCPA requires that the automatic dialing
system use "a random or sequential number generator."' 136 The equipment
in Joffe randomly or sequentially generated email addresses to which
Internet-to-phone messages would initially be sent. In concluding that
Acacia used an automatic telephone dialing system to call Joffe, the Joffe
court implied that an email address is a number for purposes of the definition
of automatic telephone dialing system. This is yet another area in which
the Joffe court either overlooked or ignored the statutory requirements for
an automatic telephone dialing system in rushing to the conclusion that
Acacia called Joffe using an automatic telephone dialing system.
134 Joffe, 121 P. 3d at 839.
135 Seeid. Seegenerally 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (2001 & Supp. zoo8).
136 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(I)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
[VOL. 97
2008- 2009] UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL TEXT MESSAGES 331
Although the TCPA provides no statutory definition for "dial," the Joffe
court was quickly persuaded that Acacia dialed Joffe's cellular telephone
number when it sent Joffe Internet-to-phone messages. However, the
issue of whether text messaging involves dialing a telephone number
may not be as cut and dry as the Joffe court suggests. Despite the court's
conclusion to the contrary, it is hard to square the Joffe court's definition
of dialing with the process of sending an Internet-to-phone message.
Absent the use of an automatic telephone dialing system, the TCPA cannot
apply to text messaging generally, let alone to unsolicited commercial text
messages.
CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991 there was no way to foresee
the advances in communication technology that would take place over
the next fifteen years. Congress did its best, though, to anticipate those
changes and structure the TCPA accordingly.'37 Times have certainly
changed since then, and text messaging has emerged as a popular form of
mobile communication. Advertisers were not far behind this new trend in
communication, and now advertising to mobile devices is fast becoming
a business strategy, especially abroad. 3 ' While this marketing tactic is
not yet widespread in the United States, it should not be a surprise when
advertisers begin utilizing text messaging as a cheap and effective medium
for communicating with consumers.
Using cellular telephones to advertise through text messaging presents
a unique problem under the TCPA. Obviously the TCPA was enacted
to address the problem of unsolicited telephone advertising, but should
the TCPA apply to text messaging merely because cellular telephones are
used? Taking up this difficult question, the court in Joffe concluded that a
text message involves making a call. Notably, the FCC has also voiced its
opinion that a text message is a call for purposes of the TCPA. The issue
remains open for debate, but even assuming a text message is a call, the
TCPA may still not apply to unsolicited commercial messages.
The issue of whether an automatic telephone dialing system can be
used to send a text message presents the toughest obstacle for applying
the TCPA to text messaging. The Joffe court provides less than satisfactory
support, and sometimes none at all, for its position that sending a text
message involves use of an automatic telephone dialing system. The
137 See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of ig9i, 18 EC.C.R. 14014, 14092 (June 26, 2003), 2003 WL 21517853 ("It
is clear from the statutory language and the legislative history that Congress anticipated
that the FCC, under its TCPA rulemaking authority, might need to consider changes in
technologies.").
138 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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arguments opposing the Joffe court's conclusion seem better reasoned. Text
messaging does not involve dialing a cellular telephone number, and for
this and other reasons, text messages cannot be sent using an automatic
telephone dialing system. If such a conclusion is reached, then the TCPA
cannot be applied to unsolicited commercial text messages.
Receiving definitive answers to the questions of whether a text message
is a call and whether an automatic telephone dialing system can be used to
send a text message will take time. Although the Joffe court answered both
questions in the affirmative, that Arizona Court of Appeals' decision is far
from binding. As these issues are addressed by more courts, the Joffe court's
conclusions with respect to both issues must be critically evaluated. While
the words "call" and "dial" on their own seem easy enough to interpret,
new technologies such as text messaging will push the definitions of those
words and test the applicability of the TCPA.
Times have changed since 1991, and with it the technology through
which people communicate. The purpose of the TCPA remains the
protection of consumer interests, but it may just be that new forms of
communication technology, such as text messaging, will render the TCPA
obsolete. If such is the case, another question, albeit beyond the scope of
this Note, arises: Should courts be able to extend the TCPA's reach, or should
it be left to Congress to amend the TCPA or enact entirely new legislation
to address its shortcomings? The average American consumer is on the
move now more than ever, and telemarketers have gone mobile trying to
catch up. The only question now is whether the TCPA will remain as the
consumer's gatekeeper or fall by the wayside when unsolicited consumer
text messages become the new vehicle for mass telemarketing.
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